By entering new market, …rms face uncertainty about their potential demand. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. Firms can locate outside the city and market conditions are common knowledge. Then we introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. It results that demand uncertainty can be seen as a di¤ erentiation force when the …rst entrant faces demand uncertainty and as an agglomeration force when it is the second entrant. Finally, …rm 2's imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.
1

Introduction
The "Minimum Di¤erentiation Principle" introduced by Hotelling (1929) represents a starting point in the theory of location. According to this principle, when two …rms propose an homogeneous product and when the demand is inelastic, then …rms locate as close to each other as possible, i.e. at the center of the city. Re…nements and extensions of this principle lead to a growing literature in Industrial Organization …elds. One extension studied in this paper consists of the sequential entry of …rms which are imperfectly informed about demand location.
In most markets, products are horizontally di¤erentiated. From an economic point of view, we argue say that products are di¤erentiated if consumers based their decisions not only upon prices but upon other characteristics too. These characteristics include location, design, etc. Most of studies note that the higher homogeneous products, the higher is the competition. This point explains the well-known "Maximum Di¤erentiation Principle" of D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) who demonstrate that in a standard Hotelling framework with quadratic transportation costs and price competition, …rms seek to move as far away from the other. Horizontal di¤erentiation represents a mean to relax price competition 1 (see for example Netz and Taylor, 2002 , for the retail gasoline industry).
However, the observation of economic activities points out that the "Maximum Di¤erentiation Principle" is not a common phenomenon. In some markets, …rms are induced to agglomerate despite of the centrifugal force of price competition. As noted by Fujita and Thisse: "a commercial area involving a large number of stores, restaurants, or theatres is likely to emerge when it o¤ers su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products, or when the transport cost borne by consumers are low enough, or both", (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p.219) . Historically, one of the …rst explanations refers to economies of scale encounter by consumers. When consumers are imperfectly informed about prices, cluster of sellers may facilitate price comparisons (Stahl, 1982b) . The same result occurs if, instead of price comparisons, consumers' choices are driven by cost considerations (Eaton and Lipsey, 1979; Stahl, 1982a) . By means of the combination of several dimensions of di¤erentiation into the Hotelling model, some researchers have shown that if one dimension overtakes the others, maximum di¤erentiation appears only in this …rst. This conclusion, named the "Max-Min Principle" is another explanation to agglomeration if geographical dimension is a minor one. (see Tabuchi, 1994; Irmen and Thisse, 1998; Ansari, Economides, and Steckel, 1998) . Quality uncertainty represents another possible explanation of agglomeration force. As Bester (1998) and Vettas (1999) show, when consumers face uncertainty over the quality of a good, like in "experience goods", …rms are more likely to cluster together. More precisely, a high quality …rm may choose to signal its quality to consumers by locating close to its competitors. Or when price is used to ascertain the quality of goods, …rms are engaged in drastic quality competition which relaxes di¤erentiation in horizontal dimension. Our approach has a common feature with these two last: uncertainty. Nonetheless, we focus on consequences of demand uncertainty. We tend to examine whether one-sided demand uncertainty can be seen, in some contexts, as a mean of generating agglomeration force when products are not di¤erentiated in other dimensions.
Uncertainty about demand location -or similarly consumer tastes -is a parameter which is usually involved in manager's decision-making process. For example, if a …rm decides to establish in a new market or to launch a new product, it encounters the problem of estimating accurately the location of potential buyers or consumer's preferences. Its decisions, often irreversible, will have a critical in ‡uence on its pro…t. Automobile industry is littered with examples of new models which didn't success. French constructors Renault and Peugeot have recently made a ‡op with their new models Aventime and 1007, respectively. These mistakes in the evaluation of consumers'taste have now dramatic consequences on …rms'revenue 2 . Such decisions are made under uncertainty about demand conditions.
Only few models take this parameter into account since location models are usually based under the assumption of complete information about consumers' location or tastes. A …rst step in this way is the work of Jovanovic (1981) who studies a model of entry and location with n …rms which have private information about consumers'location. In another way, Harter (1996) extends Neven's game of sequential entry (Neven, 1987) by introducing demand uncertainty; Firms know only the distribution from which the location of the uniform interval of consumers'taste will be drawn. Balvers and Szerb (1996) introduce demand uncertainty which comes from unobservable aspects of products. Uncertainty resides over the common quality valuation of a …rm's product under …xed prices. More recently, Casado-Izaga (2000) investigates uncertainty about consumer tastes with identical …rms, by allowing consumer distribution to shift to the right of the unit interval, following a parameter drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval [0; 1]. The purpose of our model is to extend the studies of Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) who analyse the in ‡uence of di¤erent levels of …rms' uncertainty over consumer distribution into a spatial duopoly location-then-price game with simultaneous location.
Yet previous works su¤er from di¤erent limits. The early studies didn't take 2 See Les échos, February 06, 2007. into account the possibility for …rms to locate outside the "imaginary city", while the most accomplished works of Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) didn't achieve to integrate the sequentiality of the game. Or sequentiality is a more realistic description of the way by which …rms enter the market. A mean to encompass this problem is to consider the issue of demand uncertainty as an asymmetric problem. In real life, all …rms are not equal towards demand uncertainty. Some …rms may have private information due to past experiences or costly market studies, while others may be fully uncertain. The case of onesided demand uncertainty has been largely explored when …rms choose their output level, but without location decision (see Liu, 2005 for homogeneous products and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Pinto, 2006 for di¤erentiated products). In this context, when the leader has an informational advantage compared to the follower, the leader does not have necessarily a global advantage over the follower since this last can easily adapt its strategy according to the leader's observable action. Now, if we introduce sequential location choices with onesided demand uncertainty in a Hotelling framework, several questions arise: What does the advantage of the …rst mover become when the leader has an informational advantage compared to the follower? And similarly when it is the follower who has an informational advantage about demand location? Finally, what does happen in terms of di¤erentiation and welfare considerations?
Our model takes place in the standard Hotelling duopoly model with quadratic transportation costs. Firms choose sequentially their location, but the location of demand is revealed to the …rms before the price subgame. The uncertainty over consumers'taste (demand location) is described by a continuous density function with support [M ; M ] contained in the closed interval . The size of uncertainty is allowed to vary by changing the variance 2 of the distribution. In a …rst step, we investigate the case where demand uncertainty is supported by the incumbent, while the second entrant has private information. In a second step, we reverse the situation and suppose that the …rst entrant has perfect information about demand location while the second entrant faces demand uncertainty. Results obtained highlight that demand uncertainty can be seen as a di¤erentiation force when the …rst entrant faces demand uncertainty. However, when the second entrant has imperfect information about consumer location, demand uncertainty can be an explanation of agglomeration force. This result is close to that obtained by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) and de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985) who introduce uncertainty at the individual level. Demand uncertainty appears as a mean to intensify the …rst mover advantage, which is induced to locate closer to its competitor in order to increase its market share. As consequence, …rms are engaged in …erce price competition and this statement leads to the worst situation from a social point of view.
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed as follow. In section 2, we expose our benchmark model of location-then-price competition in a Hotteling framework 4 with sequential entry and where …rms can locate outside the city. We introduce in section 3 one-sided demand uncertainty …rstly for the leader and secondly for the follower. Then we analyse their welfare implications. Finally section 4 concludes.
2 Location-then-price game under demand certainty
In this section, we analyse the usual Hotelling framework in which …rms locate sequentially under demand certainty, but they can locate outside the city. This case corresponds to our benchmark model and refers to previous results demonstrated by Lambertini (1994) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) .
Consider a unit mass of consumers distributed uniformly over the closed in-
], with M 2 R. Each consumer patronizes one of the two …rms indexed i = 1; 2 located on x i 2 R. Without loss of generality, we suppose that x 1 < x 2 , such that it is impossible for …rms to be located at the same place 3 . Firms sell a homogeneous good produced with constant marginal costs normalized to 0. As product is not vertically di¤erentiated, the sole difference between consumers'appreciation refers to consumers'taste according to the ideal product in terms of geographic location or product characteristic. Consumers have unit demands. The utility derived by a consumer located on
] for patronize …rm i is:
Where p i represents the price of the good provided by …rm i , t > 0 and t(x i z) 2 represents a quadratic transportation costs for consumer z to visit a …rm located in x i : The quadratic expression of transportation costs can be justi…ed on two grounds. On the one hand, for consumers, this assumption appears natural since the loss of utility for a consumer who buys a di¤erent product than that desired is increasingly large the further away the product location is. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, this assumption enables to obtain the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium prices, a major problem of the usual Hotelling linear framework (D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979) . We assume that R > 0 is the basic reservation utility obtained by a consumer patronizing one of the two …rms. R is supposed to be large enough so that, in equilibrium, the entire market is covered.
We consider the following game:
Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses its location Stage 2: Firm 2 chooses its location Stage 3: Firms simultaneously compete in prices Our model takes place in a framework of sequential Hotelling game widely explored since the early works of Hay (1976) and Prescott and Visscher (1977) . In this context, …rms can choose asymmetric locations and they have the possibility to locate outside the city. We solve the game by backward induction and look for subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth SPE) when …rms maximize their pro…ts and consumers their utilities 4 . We analyse in a …rst step price competition and thereafter location competition.
Equilibrium prices
We focus on the SPE of our two stages location-then-price competition. We …rst resolve the subgame equilibrium prices for a given pair of locations (x 1 ; x 2 ). Firms'demand is function to the marginal consumer location, in other words the consumer who is indi¤erent between patronizing …rm 1 or …rm 2. Let z 2 [M As usual, we start by establishing the follower's optimal location and then the leader's one. This backward induction leads to the following proposition Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under Certainty) The unique SPE locations for our location-then-price competition in an extended Hotteling framework is given by:
the equilibrium prices associated to these locations is given by
and the following equilibrium pro…ts 1 = 8 9 t and 2 = 2 9 t (8)
The equilibrium di¤erentiation under certainty c , is given by x 2 x 1 = 1.
PROOF. See Appendix B
This is the traditional result underlined by Lambertini (1994) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) when …rms can locate outside the city and when only one dimension of di¤erentiation exists. The …rst entrant locates at the center in order to maximize its pro…t, whereas second entrant moves away from the center to (M + 1) in order to soften price competition. Firm 2 faces the tradeo¤ between increasing its market share by locating closer to …rm 1 -and so the market center -but also strengthening price competition. In this case, the negative e¤ect of price competition is stronger than the positive e¤ect of increasing market share and …rm 2 is enforced to di¤erentiate itself by locating outside the city.
From socially optimal point of view, the only constraint for the social planner is to minimize total transportation costs, since for inelastic demands pricing decisions do not a¤ect the total welfare. This leads to the following socially optimal locations, x soc 1 = 1=4 + M and x soc 2 = 1=4 + M , and socially equilibrium di¤erentiation soc = 1=2. The equilibrium locations leads to an excessive amount of di¤erentiation compared to the socially optimal locations. We analyse in the following section the equilibrium locations in case of one-sided demand uncertainty. 8 3 Location-then-price game under one-sided demand uncertainty
In this section, we introduce demand uncertainty in the location game. It is reasonable to assume that it is private information. Moreover, we suppose that …rms do not share this information between them. However, we assume that demand uncertainty occurs only for one …rm and it is revealed before the price subgame. As previously, two …rms enter sequentially into the market and propose a homogeneous product. Here we study the following scenario: …rm 1 …rst enters the market and faces uncertainty about demand location. In that case, …rm 1 faces demand uncertainty due to consumers'tastes for example: Do consumers will purchase a new product? Firm 1 doesn't know the location of consumers'ideal point when it chooses its location. Conversely, the second entrant -…rm 2 -faces few uncertainties about its demand (for simplicity we suppose that it has no uncertainty). Two hypotheses could explain that: i) we can think that …rm 2 observes demand reaction after …rm 1 locates and/or ii) …rm 2 has private information about the nature of the demand. After …rms have chosen their locations, the demand uncertainty is revealed (for …rm 1) and …rms compete simultaneously in prices 5 . Such a situation can be summarized by the following game in four steps: In a second step, we change …rms'available information. We suppose now that …rm 1 is perfectly informed about the demand distribution, but …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty.
This kind of framework refers to the works of Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) when both …rms face uncertainty at the aggregate level but locate simultaneously. Consumers are still uniformly distributed 6 over the closed interval For simplicity, let t = 1. We assume that …rms are risk neutral (i.e. they choose locations which maximize their expected pro…ts) and they still locate sequentially. By backward induction, …rm 2 chooses the location which maximizes its (expected) pro…t (when it faces demand uncertainty) then …rm 1 chooses its location which maximizes its (expected) pro…ts (when it faces demand uncertainty), given …rm 2's optimal location.
Equilibrium prices
Locations are chosen sequentially: Firstly …rm 1 and thereafter …rm 2. Whatever the …rm which faces demand uncertainty, when …rms are located demand is revealed. Price competition is carried out with perfect information for both …rms. Firm 1's pro…t is given by 1 = p 1 (z (M 1 2 )) and similarly …rm 2's pro…t is given by 2 = p 2 ((M + 1 2 ) z):We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For that, we depart from the resolution of the price competition game. As demand uncertainty is revealed before the price competition, the resolution of the price subgame is the same than that obtained previously (with t = 1).
Lemma 2 The unique equilibrium prices is given by:
Let see what happens in the location subgame.
7 If this condition is not satis…ed, Meagher and Zauner (2004) demonstrate that one …rm has an incentive to move closer to its competitor until this condition is satis…ed. 8 Another implication of the size of the support of the uncertainty is that 2 1=4.
Equilibrium locations when …rst entrant faces demand uncertainty
We turn now to the resolution of the location subgame. As …rm 2 locates with perfect information about demand location, its optimal location doesn't change compared to the benchmark case, i.e. x 2 = 1 3
M . We solve now the optimal location for …rm 1, given …rm 2's optimal location. Firm 1's optimal location will be that it maximizes its expected pro…t:
M ax E( 1 ) with x 2 = 1 3
That becomes:
where we use:
The expected pro…t function is used to determine Nash equilibrium by solving the …rst order condition: @E( 1 )=@x 1 = 0, then we check second order condition. It appears that x 1 = 3 2 + 1 2 p 9 4 2 is the sole optimal location for …rm 1. It results the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Locations when Firm 1 Faces Demand
Uncertainty) The duopoly location-then-price game when …rm 1 faces demand uncertainty has: the following equilibrium locations x 1 = 3 2 + 1 2 p 9 4 2 and x 2 = 1 2 + 1 6 p 9 4 2 + 2 3 M
with associated equilibrium prices p 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = 2 27 6 p 9 4 2 + 2M 3 p 9 4 2 + 2M M .
PROOF. See Appendix C Figure 1 plots the equilibrium locations, the equilibrium di¤erentiation and the equilibrium pro…ts di¤erence ( 1 2 ) as a function of the standard deviation of the uncertainty 9 . Compared to the situation with demand certainty where …rm 1 locates at the center of the market, we note here that uncertainty leads it to move farther away to the center. Conversely, with the increase of uncertainty, …rm 2 locates closer to the center, but at a lower rate. These moves are described by the curves representing equilibrium locations and the equilibrium di¤erentiation. However …rm 1's decision is taken by anticipating that …rm 2 locates with perfect information about consumers'location. With perfect information, …rm 1's optimal decision is not to be a long way from the market center but uncertainty acts slightly as a di¤erentiation force 10 . In fact, …rm 1's strategy represents a consequence of the trade-o¤ between increasing the degree of di¤erentiation in order to reduce price competition or decreasing this latter in order to obtain a higher market share. When uncertainty occurs, the rise of the degree of di¤erentiation has a positive e¤ect of reducing price competition which is more pronounced than the negative e¤ect of losing market share. Firm 1 is induced to preserve a part of its hinterland. This result leads to soften price competition and it induces …rms to set up higher prices than in the certainty case, which have a positive e¤ect on …rms' pro…t. However, the rise of uncertainty is not in favor of …rm 1. The higher the uncertainty, the higher reduced is its pro…t, compared to the certainty case. Yet this fact is still at a slight level. The bene…t on pro…t is solely for …rm 2. Now, if we compare the equilibrium di¤erentiation in case of demand certainty and when …rm 1 entertains demand uncertainty, we observe that the di¤eren-tiation is higher in the last case. And the gap between these two situations deepens when …rm 1's demand uncertainty increases. We drop down to the result of Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) exposed in the context of uncertainty for both …rms and simultaneous location, i.e. "in equilibrium, increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to higher expected equilibrium prices, higher di¤erentiation, and higher pro…ts". When uncertainty demand, even small, occurs just for the …rst entrant, this appears as a di¤erentiation force. But our outcome is less pronounced than when both …rms face uncertainty like in Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) , Casado-Izaga (2000) or Harter (1996) 11 .
Equilibrium locations when second entrant faces demand uncertainty
Now we reverse the situation and turn to the case where …rm 1 is perfectly informed about demand location and …rm 2 entertains demand uncertainty 12 .
10 It is noteworthy that whatever the realization of M , the di¤erentiation force remains the same one. 11 The hypothesis of one-sided demand uncertainty is important since the resolution of the sequential game where both …rms face demand uncertainty yields equilibrium locations associated to roots of quartic functions. 12 Imperfect information can also refer to …rm product costs which implies the same type of behaviors for the follower (see for example Boyer, Mahenc, and Moreaux, Since demand is revealed before the price subgame, the two …rms cover the market. Firm 2's optimal location will be that which maximizes its expected pro…t:
with:
The expected pro…t function is used to determine Nash equilibrium by solving the …rst order condition: @E( 2 )=@x 2 = 0, then we check second order condition. It appears that x 2 = 1 3
12x 1 + 9 12 2 is the optimal location for …rm 2.
We solve now the optimal location for …rm 1, given …rm 2's optimal location, and knowing that …rm 1 has perfect information about the demand location. It results the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Locations when Firm 2 Faces Demand Uncertainty) In the duopoly location-then-price game when …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty: the equilibrium locations are 13
So both …rms go farther away to the center with the increase of uncertainty.
2003).
13 With A = 1458M +19764M 2 +135M 4 540M 3 14823 2 297 4 6 +M 6 + 729 9882M 2 2 18M 5 33M 2 4 +198M 4 +2196M 3 2 183M 4 2 +1215M 2 and B = 3M 4 + 36M 3 + 222M 2 2 162M 2 1332M 2 + 324M + 9 4 + 1998 2 243. …rm 1 adopts an equilibrium price slightly higher than in the certainty case. Conversely …rm 2 decreases drastically its equilibrium price, the decrease being more pronounced with the rise of uncertainty. the equilibrium di¤erentiation e given by x 2 x 1 decreases with the rise of uncertainty.
PROOF. See Appendix D Fig. 2 . Equilibrium locations, equilibrium pro…t di¤erence and equilibrium di¤eren-tiation as a function of the standard deviation of the uncertainty (M = 0)
Expressions of equilibrium prices, pro…ts and equilibrium di¤erentiation are unwieldy and cannot be expressed shortly in the proposition. Figure 2 will help us to comment our results 14 . In our model we assume that, at the beginning of the game, …rm 1 knows the demand location -or similarly consumer's preferences -and …rm 2 ignores it. Being uncertain about the location of consumers' ideal point, …rm 2 can act as a follower in its choice of location in order to infer some information about demand from the observation of the leader's location choice. Yet, …rm 1 anticipates …rm 2's optimal strategy. Moreover, …rm 1 possesess a double advantage: The …rst mover advantage and perfect information about location demand. This will allow it to transfer more intensively the di¤erentiation cost to …rm 2. With the increase of uncertainty, …rm 1 chooses to locate farther away to the market center, in the aim to induce …rm 2 to locate farther away to the demand too, but at a lower rate. These moves lead to a decrease of equilibrium di¤erentiation and consequently …rms are engaged in …erce price competition. But due to its …rst mover advantage which provides its a higher market share, …rm 1 is not forced to cut down its price. However, in the price subgame, …rm 2 accounts that its equilibrium location is not optimal with respect to the market center and it must cut down its price in order to not lose too much consumers (see …gure 3). The advantage of the …rst mover associated to perfect information about demand location leads to an increase in the pro…t equilibrium di¤erence ( 1 2 ) with the increase of demand uncertainty. The rise of the pro…t di¤erence is explained at the same time by the increase of …rm 1's pro…t and the decrease of …rm 2's pro…t.
A particularity of the equilibrium locations should be underlined. Depart from a level of uncertainty > 0:35, …rm 1's optimal strategy is a complex solution, which leads to an absence of a real equilibrium locations. Now, if we compare the equilibrium di¤erentiation with demand certainty and when …rm 2 entertains demand uncertainty, we observe that the di¤er-entiation is lower in the last case. The increase of uncertainty for the second entrant leads to reduce the equilibrium di¤erentiation 15 . This result is opposite to the conclusion of the previous section and Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) or Casado-Izaga (2000) . Nonetheless, our conclusion is similar to those of de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985) who introduce uncertainty at the individual level (Random Utility Model). In our context, one-sided demand uncertainty -for the second entrant -can be seen as an agglomeration force. 
Welfare analysis
Here we are going to study the welfare properties of equilibria. The social planner is supposed to be not better informed than the …rms and therefore takes its decisions before the realization of uncertainty. Then it sets prices such as consumers patronize the nearest …rm. Consequently, excluding the problem of covering the market, the objective of a social planner who manages identical …rms is to minimize the expected aggregate transportation costs T u .
The resolution of this problem gives us the socially optimal locations expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Socially Optimal Locations under Uncertainty) The duopoly location-then-price game under demand uncertainty has the following optimal locations
The socially optimal di¤erentiation is socu = 1=2 + 2 2 .
PROOF. See Appendix E Figure 5 plots the equilibrium di¤erentiation in both cases of uncertainty and socially optimal di¤erentiation as a function of the standard deviation of demand uncertainty. When the uncertainty tends to zero, we go back to the results with demand certainty and we observe excessive di¤erentiation (= 1=2) compared to the social optimum. However, the increase of uncertainty diminishes the gap between socially optimal di¤erentiation and equilibrium di¤er-entiation. This is more true when it is …rm 2 which faces demand uncertainty, as we have seen in previous section. Uncertainty tends to reduce the excessive amount of di¤erentiation. When …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty, agglomeration force pushes …rm 1 to come nearer to its competitor and equilibrium di¤erentiation is close to the socially optimal di¤erentiation with high uncertainty. The same conclusion occurs when …rm 1 faces demand uncertainty; Nevertheless the diminishing of this gap is due to the increase of the socially optimal di¤erentiation when uncertainty increases rather than the reduction of equilibrium one 16 .
However, it will be erroneous to consider that the situation where …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty is socially better than when it is …rm 1. A comparative study of transportation costs at a given level of uncertainty in these two cases could highlight this fact. These calculus allow us to specify the welfare losses as the di¤erence between the expected transportation costs for the equilibrium locations T Figure 6 plots expected transportation costs for the social optimum, equilibria locations and welfare losses when …rm 1 faces demand uncertainty (Firm 1) and when it is the …rm 2 (Firm 2) as a function of the standard deviation of the uncertainty. As well as expected, transportation costs for competitive equilibria and social optimum one rise with demand uncertainty. Uncertainty is a bad thing for welfare considerations. Nonetheless, the case where …rm 2 is the sole to encounter demand uncertainty is the worst from a social point of view. And the welfare losses rise at an exponential rate with uncertainty. In this case, the probability for a consumer to be a long way from a …rm increases. Conversely, increasing demand uncertainty has few impacts on the welfare losses when it is …rm 1 which faces demand uncertainty. Only a slight increase is noted depart from a high level of uncertainty ( 0:43).
Conclusion
By entering new market, …rms face uncertainty about the nature of the demand. In this paper, we analyse the location of …rms in such context. We depart from a simple model where …rms locate sequentially and market conditions are common knowledge. Moreover, …rms can locate outside the city
. In this situation, the …rst entrant (…rm 1) locates at the market center to maximize its pro…t and the second entrant (…rm 2) moves away to the center to soften price competition. As demonstrated in previous studies, this case yields excessive di¤erentiation compared to the social optimum. Afterwards, we introduce one-sided demand uncertainty in our benchmark model.
In a …rst step, we assume that only …rm 1 faces demand uncertainty whereas …rm 2, after the observation of the pioneering …rm's location, enters the market with private information about market conditions. In this stackelberg game, the advantage of the …rst entrant diminishes due to its imperfect information; the demand uncertainty leading it to go farther away to the center of the demand distribution, and to a decrease of its pro…ts. Conversely, …rm 2 which has perfect information locates closer to the center and it obtains a higher pro…t with the increase of uncertainty. Since with the rise of uncertainty, …rm 1 moves farther away to the center more quickly than …rm 2 goes closer to the center, equilibrium di¤erentiation increases. Demand uncertainty can be seen as a di¤erentiation force when only the …rst entrant faces demand uncertainty. But we have to keep in mind that these outcomes occur at a slight level and for a small range of uncertainty.
In a second step, we assume that only …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty whereas …rm 1 has private information. In this situation, …rm 2 acts as a follower by trying to infer some information about demand location through the observation of the leader's one. But anticipating this behavior, …rm 1 goes farther away to the center with the increase of uncertainty, inducing …rm 2 to locate farther away to the demand too. Contrary to the previous case, …rm 1 moves farther away to the center more quickly than …rm 2 -in order to transfer more intensively the di¤erentiation cost -and thus equilibrium di¤erentiation decreases. Consequently, demand uncertainty when only the second entrant is concerned can be seen as an agglomeration force. Such strategy is robust with Random Utility Model. In this situation, the advantage of the …rst mover increases since it sets a similar price and obtains higher pro…ts than in the case of demand certainty.
Finally, the impact of demand uncertainty on welfare is on three kinds. Firstly, the increase of uncertainty reduces the gap between socially optimal di¤eren-tiation and equilibrium di¤erentiation, whatever the …rm who faces demand uncertainty. Secondly, the aim of the social planner being the minimisation of transportation costs, demand uncertainty leads to higher costs -and so to higher welfare losses -than the situation where both …rms have perfect information about market conditions. Thirdly, the worst situation for welfare considerations is encounter when …rm 2 faces demand uncertainty.
It is noteworthy that these results highlight the role played by a social planner or a regulation agency who publicizes information when it faces itself demand uncertainty. Otherwise, when it is perfectly informed about demand location it appears that a strict control of locations is preferable 17 . 
